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Abstract—Home appliance manufacturers strive to obtain feed-
back from users to improve their products and services to build a
smart home system. To help manufacturers develop a smart home
system, we design a federated learning (FL) system leveraging the
reputation mechanism to assist home appliance manufacturers
to train a machine learning model based on customers’ data.
Then, manufacturers can predict customers’ requirements and
consumption behaviors in the future. The working flow of the
system includes two stages: in the first stage, customers train
the initial model provided by the manufacturer using both the
mobile phone and the mobile edge computing (MEC) server.
Customers collect data from various home appliances using
phones, and then they download and train the initial model with
their local data. After deriving local models, customers sign on
their models and send them to the blockchain. In case customers
or manufacturers are malicious, we use the blockchain to replace
the centralized aggregator in the traditional FL system. Since
records on the blockchain are untampered, malicious customers
or manufacturers’ activities are traceable. In the second stage,
manufacturers select customers or organizations as miners for
calculating the averaged model using received models from
customers. By the end of the crowdsourcing task, one of the
miners, who is selected as the temporary leader, uploads the
model to the blockchain. To protect customers’ privacy and
improve the test accuracy, we enforce differential privacy on
the extracted features and propose a new normalization tech-
nique. We experimentally demonstrate that our normalization
technique outperforms batch normalization when features are
under differential privacy protection. In addition, to attract more
customers to participate in the crowdsourcing FL task, we design
an incentive mechanism to award participants.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Crowdsourcing, Differential pri-
vacy, Federated learning, IoT, Mobile edge computing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT)-enabled smart home system con-
cept has attracted attention and gained great popularity in
the last few years since they have an aim to increase the
quality of life. A report by Statista [1] estimates that by 2022,
the smart home market size around the world will be 53.3
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billion. This smart home concept is mainly enabled by IoT
devices, smart phone, modern wireless communications, cloud
& edge computing, big data analytics, and artificial intelli-
gence (AI). In particular, these advanced technologies enable
manufacturers to maintain a seamless connection among their
smart home appliances. With the proliferation of smart home
devices, tremendous data are generated. Federated learning
(FL) enables analysts to analyze and utilize the locally gener-
ated data in a decentralized way without requiring uploading
data to a centralized server; that is, the utility of data are
well maintained despite data are preserved locally. To help
home appliance manufacturers smartly and conveniently use
data generated in customers’ appliances, we design an FL-
based system. Our system considers home appliances of the
same brand in a family as a unit, and a mobile phone is
used to collect data from home appliances periodically and
train the machine learning model locally [2]. Since mobile
phones have limited computational power and battery life, we
offload part of the training task to the edge computing sever.
Then, the blockchain smart contract is leveraged to generate a
global model by averaging the sum of locally trained models
submitted by users. In this federated way, source data are
supposed to maintain security and privacy.
However, Melis et al. [3] demonstrated that gradient updates
might leak significant information about customers’ training
data. Attackers can recover data from gradients uploaded by
customers [4]. Besides, the federated approach for training the
model is susceptible to model poisoning attacks [5]. In addi-
tion, information leakage risks exist in the third party’s mobile
edge computing (MEC) server [6]. To address aforementioned
security and privacy issues, we adopt blockchain and differen-
tial privacy. It is worth noting Apple is successfully applying
differential privacy in FL to improve the privacy of its popular
voice assistant service Siri [7]. Specifically, manufacturers
upload a preliminary model with initialized parameters. The
model is available on the blockchain for customers to down-
load and train with their local data. The blockchain assists the
crowdsourcing requester (i.e. manufacturer) to audit whether
there are malicious updates from customers. The traditional
crowdsourcing system is hosted by a third party, which charges
customers costly service fees, while our designed system
uses blockchain to record crowdsourcing activities. Therefore,
customers and the requester can save high service fees while
keeping the crowdsourcing system functional. Due to the lim-
itation of the block size, we propose to use the InterPlanetary
File System (IPFS) [8] as the distributed storage solution when
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the model size is large.
More specifically, customers extract their data’s features
in the mobile using the deployed feature extractor and add
noise with a formal privacy guarantee to perturb the ex-
tracted features in the first step. In the second step, cus-
tomers train fully connected layers of the model with per-
turbed features in the MEC server. Moreover, we improve
the traditional batch normalization by removing constraints
of mean value and variance, while constraining the bound
within [−√N − 1,√N − 1], where N denotes the batch
size. After training, customers sign on hashes of encrypted
models with their private keys and transmit locally trained
models to the blockchain. Selected miners verify identities
of senders, download models and calculate the average of
all model parameters to obtain the global model. One miner,
selected as the temporary leader, encrypts and uploads the
global model to the blockchain. Furthermore, to motivate more
customers to participate in the crowdsourcing task and reduce
malicious and poisoning updates, we utilize a reputation-based
crowdsourcing incentive mechanism, which rewards reliable
customers and punish malicious customers correspondingly.
Contributions. The major contributions of this paper are
summarized as follows:
• First, a hierarchical crowdsourcing FL system is proposed
to build the machine learning model to help home ap-
pliance manufacturers improve their service quality and
optimize functionalities of home appliances.
• Second, we propose a new normalization technique which
delivers a higher test accuracy than batch normalization,
while preserving the privacy of the extracted features of
each participant’s data. Besides, by leveraging differen-
tial privacy, we prevent adversaries from exploiting the
learned model to infer customers’ sensitive information.
• Third, our blockchain-based system prevents malicious
model updates by ensuring that all model updates are
held accountable.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
In Section II, we explain the concepts of blockchain and dif-
ferential privacy used in this paper. Section III presents related
works and their deficiencies. We introduce our design of the
system in Section IV. Section V shows the advantages and
disadvantages of our designed system. Section VI presents the
experimental results showing that our technique is working.
Section VII discusses how we prevent information leakage
using differential privacy technique in our designed system.
Then, we conclude the paper and identify future directions in
Section VIII.
Notations. Notations used in the rest of the paper are
summarized in Table I.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We organize this section on preliminaries as follows. In
Section II-A, we explain the concepts of blockchain and
InterPlanetary File System. In Sections II-B and II-C, we
introduce the formal definitions of differential privacy and
federated learning, respectively.
Table I: Summary of notations
Symbol Definition
ǫ differential privacy budget
N batch size
µ mean value of normalized features
σ variance of normalized features
Lf length of feature
Wf width of feature
B each batch
Xi,j,k
value at a position 〈i, j〉 for
the feature of image k
X˜i,j,k
value at a position 〈i, j〉 for the
feature of image k after batch normalization
Xˆi,j,k
value at a position 〈i, j〉 for the
feature of image k after our normalized technique
s score
R number of updates
f Byzantine miners
∆w model update
γ reputation value
γMax maximal reputation value
h average reputation of the participating customers
L low evaluation result
H high evaluation result
A. Blockchain and InterPlanetary File System (IPFS)
The blockchain is a chain of blocks that contain the hash of
the previous block, transaction information, and a timestamp.
Blockchain originates from a bitcoin network as an append-
only, distributed and decentralized ledger to record peer-to-
peer transactions permanently and immutably. The IPFS is
a peer-to-peer distributed file system that enables distributed
computing devices to connect with the same file system. We
implement the off-chain storage by using IPFS, and store
hashes of data locations on the blockchain instead of actual
files. The hash can be used to locate the exact file across the
system.
B. Differential Privacy
Differential privacy (DP) provides a theoretical founda-
tion with a provable privacy guarantee against adversaries
with arbitrary prior knowledge and unlimited computational
power [9,10]. Intuitively, by incorporating some noise, the
output of an algorithm under DP will not change significantly
due to the presence or absence of one user’s information
in the database. By using the DP algorithm, analysts cannot
derive confidential information when analyzing the algorithm’s
outputs. DP has received much interest in both the academia
and the industry. For example, Apple incorporated DP into
its mobile operating system iOS [11]. Google implemented
a DP tool called RAPPOR in the Chrome browser to collect
information about customers [12]. A smaller privacy parameter
ǫ means stronger privacy protection but less utility of data as
more randomness is introduced to the data. The quantity ǫ is
also often referred to as the privacy cost since a smaller ǫ
means stronger privacy protection, which can be understood
as a lower privacy cost.
The Laplace mechanism of [9] can be used to ensure differ-
ential privacy by adding independent zero-mean Laplace noise
with scale λ to each dimension of the output. Specifically, λ
equals ∆/ǫ, where ∆ is the ℓ1-norm sensitivity of the query
2
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Q, which measures the maximum change of the true query
output over neighboring databases.
The post-processing property [9] of differential privacy
means that a data analyst, without additional knowledge about
the private data, cannot compute a function of the output
of a differentially private algorithm and reduce its privacy
guarantee. Hence, in our design, although noise is added to an
intermediate layer of the neural network, the post-processing
property ensures that the final trained model also satisfies
differential privacy.
C. Federated Learning
Traditional machine learning algorithms are conducted in a
centralized data center where data owners upload their data.
However, data are privacy sensitive, and data owners are
unwilling to share; thus, collecting data is a tough and verbose
task that hinges the progress of machine learning. To avoid
the data deficiency problem as well as maintain the machine
learning model’s accuracy and performance, a decentralized
approach of conducting machine learning, federated learning
(FL), is proposed [13]; that is, data are distributed and scat-
tered among different users, and no such a single node stores
the whole dataset. The workflow of FL is that each user trains a
local machine learning model using her dataset and uploads it
to the centralized model for summarizing and averaging. Then,
a global model is achieved in the centralized server. Thus,
FL prevents a single point of failure effectively. FL is similar
to the traditional distributed machine learning [14], but as-
sumptions on local datasets are different. More specifically, the
traditional distributed learning aims at optimizing the parallel
computing power, but data are IID among different parties,
while FL focuses on the heterogeneous local datasets, meaning
that training data can be distributed, non-IID, and unbalanced
among various participants. That is, each participant i trains
the same model with her local dataset, and the goal is to
obtain a global model with the minimized averaged sum of
loss functions among all participants.
III. RELATED WORK
Blockchain and federated learning (FL) techniques have
been widely used in training a neural network with distributed
data [15]–[24]. For example, Weng et al. [21] proposed a
system called DeepChain for the collaborative learning. But
they did not offload the training task to the edge server, and
they did not propose to use differential privacy to protect
the privacy of model parameters. Awan et al. [20] proposed
a blockchain-based privacy-preserving FL framework, which
secured the model update using blockchain’s immutability
and decentralized trust properties. Li et al. [25] designed a
blockchain-based decentralized framework for crowdsourcing
tasks, which enabled them to do crowdsourcing tasks without
a centralized server. Lu et al. [16] proposed to leverage
blockchain, FL, and differential privacy for data sharing.
However, they directly added differential privacy noise to
the original data instead of the gradients, which may affect
the accuracy seriously. Lyu et al. [22] made the first-ever
investigation on the federated fairness in a blockchain-assisted
decentralized deep learning framework, and designed a local
credibility mutual evaluation mechanism to enforce fairness.
They also developed a three-layer onion-style encryption
scheme to guarantee both accuracy and privacy.
Moreover, FL has attracted substantial attention re-
cently [26]–[30], and one of the most important issues in
FL is privacy protection, which is explored in [31]–[35].
Li et al. [31] considered the privacy issue during sharing model
updates in FL. They proposed to leverage the sketch algorithms
to build the sketching-based FL, which provides privacy
guarantees while maintaining the accuracy. Hao et al. [32]
proposed a privacy-enhanced FL scheme to solve the privacy
issue in FL. Their scheme helps to achieve efficient and
privacy-enhanced FL for IAI. Dolui et al. [33] applied FL
paradigms in recommender systems and matrix factorization,
which guarantees the recommender systems’ functionality and
privacy. Nasr et al. [34] performed a comprehensive privacy
analysis with white-box inference attacks. Wang et al. [35]
proposed a framework incorporating generative adversarial
network (GAN) with a multitask discriminator to solve the
user-level privacy leakage in FL against attacks from a mali-
cious server.
Furthermore, there are many studies focusing on the
privacy-preserving crowdsourcing [36,37], and leveraging the
fog computing or edge computing to improve the perfor-
mance as they have gained popularity [38]–[43]. For example,
Wu et al. [36] proposed two generic models for quantify-
ing mobile users’ privacy and data utility in crowdsourced
location-based services, respectively. He et al. [38] designed a
privacy model for the crowdsourced bus service, which takes
advantage of the computational power of the fog computing.
However, their models are applicable only to the traditional
crowdsourcing approach (i.e., customers transmit data to a
centralized server) without considering the FL crowdsourcing
tasks which leverage locally trained models. Zhao et al. [40]
presented with a privacy-preserving mechanism to prevent the
poisoning attack to the mobile edge computing. However,
users need to offload data to the MEC server in their system
which may leak the privacy, instead, we propose that users
retain their data locally.
In addition, a few studies have combined deep learning or
FL with the edge computing [44,45]. Lyu et al. [44] proposed
a fog-embedded privacy-preserving deep learning framework,
where both training data and test data were crowdsourced from
end devices. Random Projection (RP) and Differentially Pri-
vate SGD (DPSGD) were considered in a two-level protection
mechanism to protect the privacy of both training data and test
data. Jiang et al. [45] designed a collaborative training method
to protect features’ privacy. In detail, the feature extraction is
done locally in the devices such as smartphones while the
classification is executed in the cloud service. However, they
did not use the FL to protect the privacy of training data, and
they did not propose a normalization technique to improve the
test accuracy.
IV. SYSTEM DESIGN
In this section, we present the system which we design
for smart home appliance manufacturers who are interested in
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Figure 1: An overview of our system.
building a machine learning model using data from customers’
home appliances to analyze customers’ habit and improve their
service and products.
A. System Overview
Figure 1 shows an overview of our system architecture. The
system consists of three primary components: manufacturers,
customers and blockchain. Specifically, manufacturers raise a
request for a crowdsourcing FL task. Then, customers who are
interested in the crowdsourcing FL tasks submit their trained
models to the blockchain. Finally, the blockchain serves as the
centralized server to gather customers’ models and a selected
miner calculates and generates the global FL model for home
appliance manufacturers. In the following, we will introduce
each component in detail.
Manufacturers. Manufacturers raise a request to build a
machine learning model to predict customers’ consumption
behaviours and improve home appliances, which is a crowd-
sourcing FL task. Customers who have home appliances can
participate in the FL task. To facilitate the progress of FL, we
use the blockchain to store the initial model with randomly
selected parameters. Otherwise, manufacturers need to send
the model to everyone or save it in a third party’s cloud
storage. In addition, neither manufacturers nor customers can
deny recorded contributions or activities. Eventually, manufac-
turers will learn a machine learning model as more and more
customers participate in the crowdsourcing FL task.
Customers. Customers who have home appliances satisfy-
ing crowdsourcing requirements can apply for participating in
the FL task. However, due to home appliances are equipped
with heterogeneous storage and computational powers, it is
difficult to enable each IoT device to train the deep model.
To address this issue, we adopt the partitioned deep model
training approach [45,46]. Specifically, we use a mobile phone
to collect data from home appliances and extract features.
To preserve privacy, we add ǫ-DP noise to features. Then,
customers continue training fully connected layers in the MEC
server. To be specific, we clarify the customers’ responsibilities
in four detailed steps as follows.
Step 1: Customers download the initial model from the
blockchain. Customers who are willing to participate in the FL
task check and download the initial model which is uploaded
by the manufactures and available on the blockchain.
Step 2: Customers extract features on the mobile. The
mobile phone collects all participating home appliances’ data
periodically. Then, customers can start training the model
using collected data. Since the MEC server is provided by a
third-party, it may leak information. Therefore, we divide the
local training process into two phrases: the mobile training
and the MEC server training. Because perturbing original
data directly may compromise the model’s accuracy, we treat
the convolutional neural network (CNN) layers as the feature
extractor to extract features from the original data in the
mobile. Then, we add ǫ-DP noise to features before offloading
them to the fully connected layers in the MEC.
Step 3: Customers train fully connected layers in the
mobile edge computing server. The mobile sends the privacy-
preserving features and original labels to the mobile edge
computing server, so that the server helps train the fully
connected layers. The training loss is returned to the mobile
to update the front layers.
Step 4: Customers upload models to the blockchain. After
training the model, customers sign on hashes of models
with their private keys, and then they upload models to the
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blockchain via smartphones. However, if miners determine
that the signature is invalid, the transaction fails because it is
possible that an adversary is attempting to attack the learning
process using faked data. After miners confirm the transaction,
customers can use the transaction history as an invoice to
claim reward and reputation. Section IV-B shows the detail
of reputation calculation. By using the immutable property of
the blockchain, both manufacturers and customers cannot deny
transactions stored on the blockchain.
Blockchain. A consortium blockchain is used in our crowd-
sourcing system to store machine learning models perma-
nently. The consensus protocol is the Algorand which is
based on proof of stake (PoS) and byzantine fault tolerance
(BFT) [47,48]. Algorand relies on BFT algorithms for com-
mitting transactions. The following steps are required to reach
the consensus: (1) Miners compete for the leader. The ratio
of a miner’s stake (i.e., coins) to all tokens determines the
probability for the miner to be selected. Subsequently, an order
of the block proposals is obtained through hashing the random
function output with the nodes’ identities specified by their
stake. Thus, a miner with more stakes will gain a higher chance
to become a leader. (2) Committee members verify the block
generated by the selected leader. When more than 2/3 of the
committee members sign and agree on the leader’s block, the
new block gets admitted. (3) Committee members execute the
gossip protocol to broadcast the new block to neighbours to
arrive at a consensus in blockchain.
In our case, the workflow starts with a manufacturer up-
loading an initial model to the blockchain. Then, customers
can send requests to obtain that model. After training models
locally, customers upload their locally trained models to the
blockchain. Because of the limitation of the block size, we
propose to use IPFS as the off-chain storage. Then, customers
upload their models to the IPFS, and a hash will be sent to
the blockchain as a transaction. The hash can be used to
retrieve the actual data from IPFS. The leader and miners
are responsible for confirming transactions and calculating
the averaged model parameters to obtain a global model.
Miners’ results are mainly used for verifying the leader’s
result. After all customers upload their trained models, the
miners download them and start calculating the averaged
model parameters. Then, one of miners is selected as the leader
to upload the global model to the blockchain. We will explain
the process in detail as follows:
① Miners verify the validity of the uploaded model. When
a customer uploads a model or the hash of the model to
the blockchain, a miner checks the digital signature of the
uploaded file. If the signature is valid, then the miner confirms
that the update is from the legal participant and puts the
transaction in the transaction pool. Subsequently, selected
miners constitute a committee to verify all transactions in
the pool using Multi-KRUM [49,50], and accept legitimate
updates. After verifying the validity of the uploaded model,
the leader selected from miners will generate a new block
containing the uploaded file.
② A selected leader updates the model. A leader is selected
from a group of miners to update the model. Miners compete
for updating parameters to get the reward. Algorand uses
the Verifiable Random Functions (VRF) as a local and non-
interactive way to select a subset of users as the leader
candidates who form a committee (weighed by their coins)
and determine their priorities. A leader candidate with the
highest priority will become the leader to update the model
parameters. As each user is weighted by their coins, one
unit of coin can be regarded as a sub-user. A user with m
coins has m “sub-users”. Let τ be the expected number of
sub-users that the system desires to choose, and M be the
total mount of coins of all users. Then the probability p of
any coin being chosen can be set as τ/M . For a user u
with m units of currency, it will first use its secret key to
generate a hash and proof via VRF. The interval [0, 1] is
divided into m + 1 sub-intervals, so that the number j of
selected sub-users for this user is determined by which sub-
interval hash/2hashlen falls in (hashlen denotes the length
of hash); i.e., j satisfies hash/2hashlen ∈ [∑jk=0 (mk )pk(1−
p)m−k,
∑j+1
k=0
(
m
k
)
pk(1−p)m−k) (if hash/2hashlen = 1, then
j = m). Other users can use the proof to check that user u
indeed has j sub-users selected. The number of selected sub-
users is each user’s priority. The user with the highest priority
will become the leader. The selected leader is responsible for
aggregating models submitted by customers and uploading the
global model to the blockchain.
B. Incentive mechanism
To attract more customers to contribute to building the FL
model, we design an incentive mechanism. Because data in
home appliances contain customers’ confidential information
and training consumes computing resources, some customers
are unwilling to participate in training the FL model. However,
with an incentive mechanism, customers will be rewarded
based on their contributions. Then, customers may trade
for services, such as the maintenance and upgrade services
for appliances, provided by manufacturers using rewards.
Specifically, by combining the Multi-KRUM [49,50] and the
reputation-based incentive protocols [51], an incentive mech-
anism is designed to prevent the poisoning attack as well as
reward contributors properly.
That is, after the local model is uploaded, verifiers calculate
the reputation using Multi-KRUM and eliminate unsatisfied
updates. The verifiers, selected based on the VRF [48] from
miners, are responsible for filtering out malicious updates in
a round by running Multi-KRUM on the received pool of
updates and accepting the top majority of the updates received
each round. For every customer i, a verifier calculates a score
s(i), which is the sum of Euclidean distances of i’s update to
the closest R − f − 2 updates. R is the number of updates,
and f is the number of Byzantine customers. ∆w is the model
update. It is given by
s(i) =
∑
i→j
‖∆wi −∆wj‖2, (1)
where i→ j denotes the fact that∆wj belongs to the R−f−2
closest updates to ∆wi. The R− f customers with the lowest
scores are selected while the rest are rejected.
The value of the reward is proportional to the customer’s
reputation. If a customer’s update is accepted by verifiers, the
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value of reputation increases by 1; otherwise, it decreases
by 1. Each participant is assigned with an initial reputation
value γ, and γ is an integer number from the finite set
set(0, 1, · · · , γMax), where γMax represents the max size of
this set. h is the average reputation of the whole customers.
If a miner confirms a solution and gives a positive evaluation,
the participant’s reputation will be increased and recorded in
the blockchain. Let a represent the output of the evaluation
function. a = H means a high evaluation result and a = L
means a low evaluation result. Therefore, the update rule of
the reputation γ is as follows:
γ =


min(γMax, γ + 1), if a = H and γ ≥ h
γ − 1, if a = L and γ ≥ h+ 1
0, if a = L and γ = h
γ + 1, if γ < h+ 1
(2)
where h denotes the threshold of the selected social strategy,
which is a method of using social norms (i.e., Multi-KRUM) to
control customers’ behaviours [51]. If a customer’s reputation
is h and she receives an L feedback after evaluation, her
reputation will fall to 0. The status of customers’ reputation
is recorded by the blockchain.
C. Normalization Technique
To protect the privacy of users’ update, we perturb extracted
features in the normialization layer. Now, we present the
improvement for the normalization technique proposed in [45].
Although the CNN has many channels, our analysis below
focuses on one channel only for simplicity. For this channel,
suppose the output of the convolutional layers has dimension
Lf ×Wf . Let the value at a position 〈i, j〉 for the feature of
image k be Xi,j,k. Given i and j, Jiang et al. [45] adopt the
batch normalization which transforms Xi,j,k to X˜i,j,k, so that
for each batch B, the values X˜i,j,k for k ∈ B have a mean of
0 and a variance of 1; i.e.,
1
|B|
∑
k∈B
X˜i,j,k = 0,
while
1
|B|
∑
k∈B
(X˜i,j,k)
2 = 1.
From and |B| = N and the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality, [45]
bounds
X˜i,j,k ∈ [−
√
N − 1,
√
N − 1]
for any i, j, k, so that if one value in the feature{
Xi,j,k | i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Lf} and j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,Wf}
}
of image k varies, the sensitivity of{
X˜i,j,k | i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Lf} and j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,Wf}
}
is at most 2
√
N − 1.
Then, according to Laplace mechanism [9], the independent
zero-mean Laplace noise with scale 2
√
N − 1/ǫ is added to
each X˜i,j,k for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Lf} and j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,Wf}
to protect Xi,j,k under ǫ-differential privacy. In our ap-
proach, we normalize Xi,j,k for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Lf} and
j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,Wf} as
Xˆi,j,k ∈ [−
√
N − 1,
√
N − 1],
so that if one value in the feature{
Xi,j,k | i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Lf} and j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,Wf}
}
of image k varies, the sensitivity of{
Xˆi,j,k | i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Lf} and j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,Wf}
}
is 2
√
N − 1. Then, based on Laplace mechanism [9], the
independent zero-mean Laplace noise with scale 2
√
N − 1/ǫ
is added to each Xˆi,j,k for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Lf} and j ∈
{1, 2, . . . ,Wf} to protect Xi,j,k under ǫ-differential privacy.
From the above discussions, batch normalization of [45]
enforces not only
X˜i,j,k ∈ [−
√
N − 1,
√
N − 1]
but also the mean is
1
|B|
∑
k∈B
X˜i,j,k = 0
and the variance is
1
|B|
∑
k∈B
(X˜i,j,k)
2 = 1,
while our normalization technique requires only
Xˆi,j,k ∈ [−
√
N − 1,
√
N − 1]
without any constraints on the mean and variance. Experiments
to be presented in Section VI show that our normalization
technique significantly improves the learning accuracy over
that of [45].
Next, we explain why our normalization technique outper-
forms the batch normalization. Both Jiang et al.’s solution [45]
and our solution add the same zero-mean Laplace noise to
normalized layer inputs. When using batch normalization, the
mean of features µ = 0 and the variance σ = 1. For ease
of explanation, below we use a Gaussian distribution as an
example for the distribution of the features since Gaussian
distributions appear in many real-world applications. Note
that the actual distribution of the features may not follow
Gaussian. According to the three-sigma rule of Gaussian
distribution [52], about 99.73% values lie within three standard
deviations of the mean. Similarly, most feature values after
batch normalization lie in [−3σ, 3σ] which is [−3, 3] instead
of [−√N − 1,√N − 1]. In contrast, feature values lie more
evenly in [−√N − 1,√N − 1] when using our normalization
technique. Thus, features have smaller magnitudes when using
batch normalization than using our normalization technique.
Hence, when the same amount of Laplace noise is added, fea-
ture values using batch normalization will be perturbed more
easily than using our normalization technique. For example,
when the batch size N = 64 and scale of Laplace distribution
is 2
√
N − 1/ǫ, we calculate privacy parameter thresholds for
feature values (after batch normalization or our normalization
technique) to be “overwhelmed” by the noise as follows.
In the case of batch normalization, we have
2
√
N − 1
ǫ
≫ 3σ,
=⇒ 2
√
N − 1
ǫ
≫ 3,
=⇒ ǫ≪ 16
3
≈ 5.33.
Thus, true feature values will be seriously perturbed by noise
when the privacy parameter ǫ≪ 5.33 using batch normaliza-
tion. However, when we use our normalization technique, we
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obtain that
2
√
N − 1
ǫ
≫
√
N − 1,
=⇒ ǫ≪ 2.
Hence, when the privacy parameter ǫ≪ 2, the true value will
be overwhelmed by the noise. The larger privacy parameter
means the less noise, so that feature values using batch
normalization are more vulnerable. Thus, our above example
implies that features will be perturbed more seriously when
using batch normalization than our normalization technique.
Summarizing above, the trained model with our normalization
technique will achieve a higher test accuracy than trained using
the batch normalization.
V. PROS AND CONS OF OUR FRAMEWORK
We discuss advantages and disadvantages of our framework
in this section.
A. Privacy and Security
Our system leverages differential privacy technique to pro-
tect the privacy of the extracted features. Thus, the system
keeps the participating customers’ data confidential. Further-
more, the trained model is encrypted and signed by the sender
to prevent the attackers and imposters from stealing the model
or deriving original data through reverse-engineering.
B. Delay in Crowdsourcing
Assume there is a large number of customers, and the
system highly depends on customers’ training results to obtain
the predictive model in one global epoch. Unlike other crowd-
sourcing jobs, manufacturers in our system prefers customers
to follow their lifestyle instead of rushing to finish the job
to obtain the real status. As a result, customers who seldom
use devices may postpone the overall crowdsourcing progress.
This problem can be mitigated by using the incentive mech-
anisms. Yu et al. [53] designed a queue to store customers
who submitted their models in order. Thus, customers who
submit their locally trained models early will be rewarded to
encourage people to submit their updates earlier.
VI. EXPERIMENTS
To validate the effectiveness of our designed FL with
differential privacy approach, we conduct experiments on the
MNIST handwritten image dataset [54].
A. Experiment Setup
The MNIST dataset includes 60,000 training image samples
and 10,000 test image samples. Each sample is a 28 × 28
gray scale image showing a handwritten number within 0 to
9. In addition, the MNIST is a standard dataset employed
for testing machine learning algorithms. It gives moderate
and typical complexity faced by IoT applications. Therefore,
we leverage the MNIST dataset which has been used for
testing the performance of the IoT system by [45,55]–[60].
Our designed CNN network includes hidden layers that are
responsible for feature extraction and fully connected layers
for classification. We have two convolutional layers with 30
and 80 channels, respectively. After each convolutional layer,
we deploy a max-pooling layer to reduce spatial dimensions
of the convolutional layers’ output. Therefore, max-pooling
layers accelerate the learning speed of the neural network.
Normalization is used after all non-linear layers, i.e., convolu-
tional layers. The normalization layer enables the computation
of sensitivity in differential privacy to determine the amount
of noise to add, speeds up the learning rate, and regularizes
gradients from distraction to outliers. Then, we apply ǫ-DP
noise to perturb the output of normalization layers to preserve
the privacy of the extracted features.
The perturbed features serve as inputs of fully connected
layers for classification in the MEC server. In our designed
model, fully connected layers include four hidden layers. The
dimension decreases from 3920 to the dimension of the label
which is 10. Finally, there is a softmax layer to predict label
and compute loss. The architecture of CNN is shown in
Figure 2. We simulate FL by constructing the model using
the averaged parameters of multiple locally trained model
parameters.
In our experiment, we set the hyperparameters of CNN as
follows. The learning rate is 0.01, and the batch size N is 64.
Then, we set the range of privacy parameter ǫ to be [1, 10]. The
default number of global epochs is 2 and the default number of
local epochs is 40. We use ten participants in the experiment.
Before training, we separate the training image dataset into
equally ten parts, meaning that each participant gets 6000
training images randomly.We normalize each dimension of the
feature to the interval [−√N − 1,√N − 1] forN denoting the
batch size, so that the sensitivity of the normalized feature vec-
tor when one dimension of the feature changes is 2
√
N − 1.
Then, according to Laplace mechanism [9], the independent
zero-mean Laplace noise with scale 2
√
N − 1/ǫ is added to
each dimension of the normalized features to protect features
under ǫ-differential privacy. Default ǫ = 2.
B. Experimental Results
Figure 3 compares the test accuracies between federated
learning (FL) without differential privacy (DP) and different
DP-aware FL algorithms, including DP-aware FL using our
normalization technique, and DP-aware FL using Jiang et al.’s
batch normalization [45]. Figure 3 shows the superiority of
DP-aware FL using our normalization technique over DP-
aware FL using Jiang et al.’s batch normalization [45]. Thus,
we confirm that our normalization technique is useful when
we add Laplace noise to features, because we relax constraints
of normalization compared with batch normalization as stated
in Section IV-A. A feature goes through batch normalization
often results in a smaller magnitude than that goes through
our normalization technique, so the value of feature is easily
overwhelmed by the noise when using batch normalization.
For each DP-aware FL, we also observe that the test accuracy
gets closer to the test accuracy of FL without DP as the privacy
parameter ǫ increases, because a larger privacy parameter ǫ
means less privacy protection which equals that less noise is
used. Thus, we conclude that our normalization technique out-
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Figure 2: The neural network used in experiments.
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Figure 3: Impacts of normalization techniques on the test
accuracy.
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Figure 4: Impact of the batch size on the test accuracy of the
FL model protected with DP (ǫ = 2).
performs the batch normalization under ǫ-differential privacy
when training FL model.
Figure 4 presents that the test accuracy of FL model de-
creases as the batch size increases when the number of global
epoch is 1 and DP parameter ǫ = 2. This is because we add
Laplace noise to features, the added noise will increase as the
batch size N increases, which results in a worse test accuracy.
Moreover, due to the three-sigma rule in Gaussian distribution,
most feature values normalized with batch normalization lie
in [−3σ, 3σ]. But feature values normalized using our nor-
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Figure 5: Impact of the batch size on the test accuracy of
the FL model using our normalization technique without DP
protection.
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Figure 6: Impact of the batch size on the test accuracy under
different global epochs using our normalization technique (ǫ =
2).
malization technique lie in [−√N − 1,√N − 1]. However,
Figure 5 shows that if no differential privacy noise is added,
the test accuracy with the batch normalization outperforms
that using our normalization technique. Moreover, as the batch
size increases, the test accuracy will decrease. Therefore, we
conclude that our normalization technique works better with
FL under DP protection. Furthermore, Figure 6 illustrates that
the test accuracy is better when the number of global epoch
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Figure 7: Impact of DP parameter ǫ on the test accuracy using
our normalization technique under various global epochs.
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Figure 8: Impact of the number of local epochs on the test
accuracy using our normalization technique under various
global epochs when ǫ = 2.
= 2 than the number of global epoch = 1 or 3 when ǫ = 2
and the number of local epochs is 40. As the number of global
epochs increases, the test accuracy increases if DP noise is
not added. However, Laplace noise increases as the number
of global epochs increases, which negatively affects the test
accuracy. Thus, a trade-off between the number of global
epochs and the amount of noise is required. In our case, when
the privacy parameter ǫ = 2 and the number of local epochs
is 40, the optimal number of global epochs is 2.
Figure 7 illustrates how the privacy parameter ǫ affects
the test accuracy of FL model. In our experiment, we train
FL with 4 global epochs to validate the practicality of our
designed approach. The test accuracy increases as the privacy
parameter ǫ increases. A larger ǫ means that less noise is
added to features, so that the privacy protection is weaker. In
the literature, typical ǫ values chosen for experimental studies
are between 0.1 and 10 [61]. Our experiment shows that we
can achieve at least 90% accuracy when the global epoch
= 2 and the privacy parameter ǫ > 1. Before training, we
initialize the model with random parameters, and the model
with initial parameters will be used by all parties for their
local training. After the first global epoch, we obtain a new
model by averaging all parties’ model parameters. Then, in
the second global epoch, parties start training using the model
from the first global epoch. Through our experiment, we can
verify that our designed FL method is effective. However,
when the number of global epochs increases to 3 or 4, the test
accuracy may decrease. The test accuracy decreases because
the noise increases as the number of global epochs increases.
Figure 8 shows that the test accuracy of FL model is affected
by both the number of local epochs and the number of the
global epochs. The number of local epochs reflects the cost
of devices’ computing resources locally. We add ǫ-differential
privacy noise during training, and the test accuracy may drop
if there is too much noise added in each epoch. From Figure 8,
when the number of local epochs equals 20 or 30, it takes 4
global epochs to achieve a similar accuracy. When the number
of local epochs is 40, it takes 2 global epochs. But the test
accuracy will start to drop if the number of local epochs is
40 and the number of global epoch is more than 2. Hence,
to obtain a high test accuracy, it necessities optimal values to
strike a good balance between the number of local epochs and
global epochs for averaging locally uploaded models, which
we leave as the future work.
C. Performance evaluation on the mobile device and edge
server
Now, we evaluate the feasibility and efficacy of training on
the mobile device. A Raspberry Pi 4Model B tiny computer in
Figure 9 is used to act as the mobile device. Key specifications
of the Raspberry Pi 4 Model B are listed in Table II. We take
a laptop to emulate the edge server, which is equipped with
four 2.3 GHz Intel Core i5 processors, 8 GB of RAM, and
MacOS 10.14.4 system.
Table II: Raspberry Pi 4 Model B Specifications.
Broadcom BCM2711, Quad core Cortex-A72 (ARM v8) 64-bit SoC
@1.5GHz
4GB LPDDR4-3200 SDRAM
In our experiment, we distribute the MNIST dataset [52]
with 60,000 images to ten participants equally so that each
participant (i.e., each device) has 6,000 images. Then, we run
the same training process on both the mobile device and the
edge server. Figure 10 shows that it takes about 144 seconds
to train the model with 6,000 images on the Raspberry Pi 4
(i.e., the mobile device) for each epoch, and it uses about 9
seconds to train the model on the laptop (i.e., the edge server).
For default forty epochs, the mobile device and the edge server
use about 96 minutes and 6 minutes, respectively. A client
is supposed to participate in the federated learning when the
smartphone is idle, such as charging, screen off, and connected
to an unmetered network, for example, WiFi [13,62]. Thus,
we confirm that it is feasible to utilize mobile devices in the
federated learning. Besides, an edge server will significantly
improve the speed of training because it trains much faster.
In addition to the training time, the delay of our proposed
approach, which depends on the transmission rate, is small be-
cause smartphones often have wideband network connections
(e.g., 4G and WiFi). The average size of locally trained models
9
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Figure 9: Raspberry Pi 4 Model B.
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Figure 10: Comparison of training time on the mobile device
and edge server.
is 617.8KB in our experiment. Assume the upload bandwidth
is 1MB/s, so the communication cost is 0.6178 second. The
communication cost is little compared with wasted training
time on the mobile device.
D. Evaluation on the incentive mechanism
In this section, we evaluate the impacts of incentive mech-
anism on customers’ reward and reputation. The assumption
and parameters in the experiments are as follows. Assume that
the maximum values of both reputation and reward are 100
(i.e., γMax = 100). Every customer has a reputation of 5 (i.e.,
h = 5) at the beginning. We set the reward for each accepted
update equal to owners’ reputation in each global epoch. The
experiments compare reward and reputation that customer can
achieve in four cases (i.e., no incentive mechanism, honest
customer, malicious customer performs poisoning attack at
global epoch = 1, and malicious customer performs poisoning
attack at global epoch = 4). If there is no incentive mechanism,
the customer gets a fixed reward of 5 in every global epoch.
As shown in Figure 11, when there is no incentive mech-
anism, the reward value is the same in each global epoch
regardless of poisoning updates. However, with the incentive
mechanism, the honest customer, whose updates are accepted,
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Figure 11: Reward comparison.
will gain more rewards as the number of global epochs
increases. If a customer’s update is considered as poisoning
(i.e., the value of s in Eq. (1) is significantly larger than
others), her update will not be accepted, that is, her reward
is 0. Besides, the behaviour of the poisoning attack affects
the value of reputation, which results in a decrease of the
reputation. If the poisoning attack is performed when the value
of the reputation is equal to the h, the customer’s reputation
will be clear, which will result in small rewards afterwards.
However, if the malicious behaviour happens when the value
of reputation is higher than h, the reputation drops by 1, so
does the reward in the subsequent global epoch.
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Figure 12: Reputation comparison.
Figure 12 shows the impact of the incentive mechanism on
the reputation. Without the incentive mechanism, customers’
reputation will be 0. If a customer is honest and uploads the
correct update in every global epoch, her reputation increases
as the number of global epoch increases. However, if a
customer uploads a malicious update when her reputation
value equals to the h (i.e., 5), her reputation will drop to 0.
However, if her reputation is not 5, her reputation drops by 1
when caught performing poisoning attack.
Thus, our incentive mechanism can encourage honest cus-
tomers to contribute their useful updates while preventing
malicious customers from attempting to perform the poisoning
attack.
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VII. DISCUSSION
To attract more customers to contribute to training the
global model, our designed system should guarantee that
customers’ confidential information will not leak. There are
studies discussing potential risks of information leakage in
FL [4,63] in which attackers may infer customers’ private
data from gradients. To prevent this scenario, we leverage
differential privacy to perturb features before classification in
the fully connected layers. Thus, gradients are also protected
by differential privacy. Hitaj et al. [4] demonstrated that a
curious server could learn the private data using the generative
adversarial network (GAN) if gradients were protected by
a large privacy budget in the collaborative learning. But
their experiments confirmed that GAN was invalid when the
selected privacy parameter was smaller than 10, which is the
upper bound of privacy parameter in our experiment, and we
can achieve the accuracy of 97%. Therefore, our designed
approach guarantees the accuracy and protects the privacy of
local models as well as data. In addition, Yin et al. [63] intro-
duced a DeepInversion method which could invert a trained
neural network to a synthesized class-conditional input images
starting from the random noise. However, they leveraged the
information stored in the batch normalization layer. In our
trained model, we add Laplacian noise during training in the
batch normalization layer, and then attackers are unable to
obtain the true information stored there. Thus, their approach
is ineffective against our trained model.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we present a design of blockchain-based
crowdsourcing FL system for IoT devices manufacturers
to learn customers better. We use multiple state-of-the-art
technologies to construct the system, including the mobile
edge computing server, blockchain, distributed storage, and
federated learning. Besides, our system enforces differential
privacy to protect the privacy of customers’ data. To im-
prove the accuracy of FL model, we design a new normal-
ization technique which is proved to outperform the batch
normalization if features’ privacy is protected by differential
privacy. By designing a proper incentive mechanism for the
crowdsourcing task, customers are more likely to participate
in the crowdsourcing tasks. The blockchain will audit all
customers’ updates during the federated training, so that the
system can hold the model updates accountable to prevent
malicious customers or manufacturers.
In the future, we aim to conduct more experiments and
test our system with real-world home appliance datasets.
Moreover, we will strive to find the deterministically optimal
balance between local epochs and global epochs to obtain a
better test accuracy.
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